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Abstract
Research suggests that people often engage in a process called “moral licensing,” through which
they point to past good deeds as a way to license their present immoral actions. Additional
research demonstrates that through a process of vicarious moral licensing, people can reference
their ingroup members’ morality to license their own morally dubious behavior. However, these
proposed moral balancing acts seem to strikingly contradict decades of research arguing that
people strive to act consistently with past behavior. The present research studies the phenomenon
of ingroup licensing specifically as it relates to political ingroup identity, and examines the
conditions under which people license their immoral actions as opposed to behaving consistently
with their past good deeds. We hypothesized that learning about their political party’s moral
actions would lead people to behave less morally themselves, that this effect would be
heightened among people with stronger political party identification, and that it would be
weakened among people with a strong moral identity concerning the behavior in question.
Together, these three studies did not establish strong support for any of the three hypotheses. The
implications of these findings are discussed, and directions for future research are proposed.
Keywords: moral licensing, vicarious licensing, ingroup, political affiliation, consistency
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Can Good Groups Create Immoral Individuals? Examining Vicarious Moral Licensing in
Political Ingroups
Introduction
As social beings, we value our own and others’ morality. One might assume that people
would do their best to uphold their moral ideals. Indeed, decades of research argues that people
strive to act consistently with past moral behavior. However, other research suggests that people
attempt to balance their moral and immoral actions by doing good deeds to counter immoral
ones, and licensing immoral behavior after demonstrating moral virtues (Meijers, Noordewier,
Verlegh, Zebregs, & Smit, 2019). This proposed moral balancing act seems to strikingly
contradict research on moral consistency. To examine under which conditions people exhibit
moral licensing as opposed to consistency, we will first review the literature on both effects.
Consistency effects and moral identity
In 1957, Festinger proposed that people strive to maintain internal psychological
consistency regarding their thoughts and behaviors to reduce cognitive dissonance. Cognitive
dissonance theory suggests that when individuals hold two or more competing cognitions, they
will experience psychological discomfort until they are able to resolve this dissonance by
altering their cognitions (Festinger, 1957). Since then, hundreds of other studies demonstrate that
people strive toward behavioral consistency. As a follow up to his original article on cognitive
dissonance, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) found that after performing a boring task,
participants who received a smaller amount of money, as opposed to a larger sum, changed their
attitudes to report more favorably on the task. The researchers posit that participants modified
their attitudes to ease the dissonance felt after performing an unpleasant and lengthy task. These
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findings strongly suggest that people feel motivated to demonstrate actions and attitudes
consistent with their prior behavior.
Other research on consistency suggests that people are motivated to behave consistently
with their prior good deeds. Exploring the mechanisms behind moral consistency cognition,
Blasi (1980) argued that by considering one’s past moral deeds, people highlight their moral selfconcept and are thus motivated to act in line with their prior moral behavior. As such, prior good
deeds and a moral sense of self are thought to constrain present behavior.
Many studies have explored the impact of cognitive dissonance on behavioral
consistency. Research on the effects of dissonance suggests that people are more likely to agree
to comply with a larger request after having already agreed to a smaller one as a means to avoid
cognitive dissonance (Freedman & Fraser, 1966). This phenomenon of complying with
increasingly large requests is called the foot-in-the door effect, and has been reliably
demonstrated by many researchers (e.g., Burger, 1999; Dillard, 1990). Taylor and BoothButterfield (1993) found that participants who had already signed a petition against drunk
driving were more likely to comply with a request to call a taxi when inebriated than participants
who had not signed the petition. Dolin and Booth (1995) discovered that women were more
likely to schedule a gynecological exam after first accepting a card with information on breast
exams. The researchers interpreted these results as evidence of the foot-in-the-door phenomenon.
Research even shows that the foot-in-the-door process does not need to occur in person. A study
by Gueguen (2002) found that the technique even works for requests sent via email. Evidence
from the foot-in-the-door phenomenon, as well as general research on consistency effects,
suggest that people strive to act in accordance with their past behavior.
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Additional research on consistency demonstrates that when moral identity is salient,
people are likely to behave consistently with their moral identity and prior good deeds. Indeed,
there is significant evidence that moral identity directly predicts moral behavior. Aquino and
Reed (2002) discovered that participants' moral identities predicted volunteerism and charitable
donations. Similarly, people with a salient moral identity demonstrate greater moral regard and
stronger prosocial intentions than people without an accessible moral self-concept (Aquino,
Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009). Additional research suggests that stronger moral identity
can predict prosocial judgements and behaviors (Sage, Kavussanu, & Duda, 2006). Reed and
Aquino (2003) found that participants whose identities highly emphasized morality demonstrated
greater prosocial behavior toward outgroup members. In addition, research suggests that people
behave particularly prosocially when their moral self-concept is salient. Kraut (1973) found that
after donating to charity, people who were labeled charitable donated more than people who did
not receive a label. These five articles demonstrate that participants behave consistently with
their moral self-concepts. Further, when moral identity is salient or prominent, people display
strengthened prosocial and moral behavior.
Other research demonstrates that people can exhibit moral consistency effects even
without their moral identity salient. Tanford and Montgomery (2014) found that after leading
participants to select a non-environmentally friendly resort, cognitive dissonance made
proenvironemtal participants rate the green resort less favorably than their less environmentally
conscious peers. In other words, for pro-environmental participants, reducing conflicting
cognitions about the green resort led participants to rate it less favorably. This finding suggests
that even without being primed with moral identity, participants behave consistently with their
moral self-concept.
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Moral licensing
Based on the aforementioned robust body of findings, one might assume that people
always behave consistently with their prior moral behavior. However, another body of research
suggests the opposite effect: people can, and often do, behave inconsistently with their previous
behavior through a process called “moral licensing.” Many studies have established a moral
licensing effect in which people use past moral behavior to earn moral “credentials” and thus
justify current immoral or selfish actions without concern that they will feel or appear immoral
(Merritt, 2010). The process occurs such that people earn moral credentials by demonstrating
their morality, and these credentials in turn allow people to license their morally dubious
behavior.
Many studies on moral licensing and balancing suggest that people often behave moremorally following an immoral act as a way to balance the scale. When asked to write a selfrelevant story regarding their negative traits, participants subsequently donated more money as a
means to regain moral self-concept (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). In addition, Baumeister,
Stillwell, and Heatherton (1994) found that participants who feel guilt behave more prosocially
as an attempt to morally cleanse. Similar, in three studies, Jordan, Mullen, and Murnighan (2011)
demonstrated that participants who recalled their prior immoral behavior behaved more morally,
reported stronger prosocial intentions, and cheated less than participants who reflected on their
prior moral actions. The researchers argue that this compensatory behavior is a means for
participants to adjust their moral self-concept. These studies provide evidence that the process of
moral licensing can occur in the reverse, which makes moral licensing a more compelling theory
of moral cognition because it can explain behavior in multiple unique contexts. Although it is
possible to interpret this phenomenon as a form of consistency in which people behave morally
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to reestablish their moral identity, the opposite pattern (i.e., using past moral behavior to justify
immoral actions) cannot be understood as a form of consistency.
Indeed, many studies demonstrate this surprising pattern of results: people not only
behave morally to counter past immoral deeds, but also often point to past moral behavior as a
way to license their present immoral actions. Much of the literature on moral licensing examines
the phenomenon through the expression of biased attitudes. In their seminal paper on moral
licensing, Monin and Miller (2001) found that when participants’ past behavior has established
their lack of prejudice, they are more willing to display explicitly biased attitudes. Similarly,
when given the opportunity to voice support for Obama, White participants were more likely to
display heightened racial bias against Black people (Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009). Further
research demonstrates that having a friend who is a member of a minority group can credential
White people to display racial bias and tolerance toward prejudiced beliefs (Bradley-Geist, King,
Skorinko, Hebl, & McKenna, 2010). Furthermore, Krumm and Corning (2008) found that
voicing support for gay rights licenses heterosexual people to express prejudiced attitudes.
Evidence of moral licensing extends beyond displays of overt prejudice, also emerging in
research on how pro-environmental behaviors can credential people to make immoral choices in
domains both related and unrelated to the environment. A study on an energy conservation
campaign found that residents of an apartment complex who conserved water subsequently
increased their electricity consumption (Tiefenbeck, Staake, Roth, & Sachs, 2013). The
researchers posit that these people used moral licensing to justify their anti-environmental
behaviors by pointing to evidence of previous pro-climate behaviors (Tiefenbeck et al., 2013).
Another study of pro-environmental behavior found that purchasing green forms of electricity
result in higher electrical use for many households (Jacobsen, Kotchen, & Vandenbergh, 2012).
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Relatedly, Mazar and Zhong (2010) argue that people who recently purchased green products
may be more likely to cheat and steal. This article suggests that good deeds can license morally
dubious behavior in unrelated domains. Mazar and Zhong’s (2010) findings are surprising
because most research investigates the process of earning credentials and then licensing a related
immoral behavior, but this study demonstrates that moral credentials can transcend domain to
license unrelated immoral behavior.
In addition, some licensing research directly addresses the impact of moral identity on
licensing effects. A study by Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin (2009) showed that writing a selfrelevant story containing words referring to positive moral traits led to an increase in moral selfconcept and, as a result, a decrease in altruistic and prosocial behavior due to an affirmation of
moral identity. Jordan, Mullen, and Murnighan (2011) found that participants who wrote about a
time they helped someone subsequently expressed decreased motivation to behave prosocially in
the future, as compared to participants who wrote about a nonmoral accomplishment. These
findings provide a direct contrast to the previously cited research on how moral identity can
often lead to consistency effects. These studies counterintuitively demonstrate that making
participants’ moral identity salient can lead to moral licensing in the same domain.
Further research demonstrates moral licensing effects in an applied context. A marketing
article by Huber, Goldsmith, and Mogilner (2008) found evidence of moral licensing both
immediately following an action as well as long after the behavior was performed. Management
research extends the theory of moral licensing to find that employees (Klotz & Bolino, 2013) and
leaders (Ormiston & Wong 2013) alike display moral licensing effects in a work setting. These
findings demonstrate that moral licensing can occur at an organizational level as well as at a
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personal level, and lend support for the generalizability of the phenomenon beyond the
laboratory setting.
The phenomenon of moral licensing has strong reliability and generalizability. In addition
to the vast body of research cited above, some meta-analyses have established the strength of this
phenomenon. Ebersole and colleagues (2015) conducted a moral licensing experiment across
many labs, and collected data from a total of 3134 participants. The researchers demonstrated the
predicted licensing effect, with a 95% confidence interval for d ranging from 0.08 to 0.21. Other
research demonstrates moral licensing effects outside the laboratory in the context of everyday
social interactions, such that people who had behaved morally earlier in the day were more likely
to subsequently act immorally (Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014). Taken together,
these findings provide additional evidence and validity to the phenomenon of moral licensing.
Hypothetical licensing
The aforementioned research on moral licensing all involved engaging in, or reflecting
on, past good deeds. However, additional research suggests that people can exhibit licensing
effects through considering hypothetical or future moral behavior. Thus, simply anticipating
doing a good deed can allow people to license their immoral behavior while maintaining their
sense of their own morality. In this vein, some psychological research has demonstrated a strong
effect of hypothetical licensing.1 Hypothetical moral licensing describes how the simple act of
planning to behave morally in the future can lead to licensing in the present (Cascio & Plant,
2015).

1

It is important to note that some articles use the term “prospective licensing” rather than
“hypothetical licensing.” However, for the sake of simplicity, this paper will use the term
“hypothetical licensing.”
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Research by Cascio and Plant (2015) found that participants who planned to behave
morally by attending a charity event felt morally licensed to display heightened racial bias. In
addition, Effron, Miller, and Monin (2012) found that just by pointing to an immoral alternative
to prior behavior people can license their current immoral behavior. Furthermore, when made to
feel insecure about their morality, people exaggerate the extent to which immoral alternatives
existed in order to obtain evidence of their morality (Effron et al., 2012). Khan and Dhar (2006)
examined how committing to behaving morally in the future can lead participants to have
positive self-concepts, and as a result can license people to engage in self-indulgent behavior.
Lastly, a meta-analysis of 91 studies on moral licensing found that both actual and hypothetical
behaviors facilitated moral licensing (Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015). These findings
suggest that people can point to both hypothetical scenarios as well as their own prior behavior to
elicit moral licensing effects. Thus, people can license without even performing a moral
behavior.
Vicarious moral licensing
The previously cited literature reveals how completed moral actions, and even
hypothetical ones, can lead to moral licensing. Yet the question remains as to whether licensing
can likewise occur even when considering someone else's prior moral behavior. Very little
research has directly addressed whether people can morally license their own immoral deeds
using their ingroup members’ good behavior. However, studies on the overlap between the self
and others can begin to provide an answer to this question.
Findings reveal that people view their own identity and self-concept as substantially tied
up with others' identities and attributes. Research suggests that in close relationships, people
view close others as included in their sense of self (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991).
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Similarly, research by Goldstein and Cialdini (2007) finds that when people identify with another
person, they can infer their own attributes from this other person’s behavior and incorporate
attributes relevant to the other person’s identity into their own self-concept. That is to say, people
incorporate close others’ behavior into their own identity. Indeed, this effect was so strong that
participants modified their behavior as a result of their changed self-perception. Other research
suggests that perspective-taking can lead to strong cognitive overlap between one’s self-concept
and perceptions of others (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996). These studies suggest that
people can view others as part of their own sense of self. This inclusion of others in one’s own
sense of self may extend to moral domains. If so, this broadened sense of self suggests that
people may use the moral actions of relevant others to license their own immoral behavior.
In addition to these studies on overlap between the self and close others, a few studies
have directly addressed ingroup moral licensing. Studying ingroup licensing provides a lens to
examine a specific manifestation of self-other overlap because ingroups share a relevant group
identity. A study conducted by Kouchaki (2011) on vicarious moral licensing found that people
are more willing to express prejudiced attitudes when their group members’ past behavior has
established non-prejudiced credentials. Banas, Cruwys, de Wit, Johnston, and Haslam (2016)
researched vicarious licensing through ingroup members’ healthy food selections. The
researchers found that after learning that ingroup members engaged in healthy behavior, people
who identify strongly with their ingroup feel less motivated to make healthy food choices (Banas
et al., 2013). Given that people perceive healthy eating in moral terms (Brown, 2013), this study
provides additional evidence of vicarious moral licensing. Most recently, Meijers, Noordewier,
Verlegh, Zebregs, and Smit (2019) found evidence that when people think about a close other
behaving pro-environmentally, they are more likely to vicariously license their own morally
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dubious intentions. Although relatively few studies have examined the topic of ingroup licensing
directly, decades of research on overlap between the self and close others along with these three
studies provide strong evidence for the existence of ingroup licensing.
Political party as ingroup
Previous research has demonstrated how stronger moral identity impacts licensing and
consistency effects. People’s moral identities are crucial to their sense of self, and people are
often motivated to act consistently with their established identity to avoid violating their selfconcept (Shao, Aquiano, & Freeman, 2008). This moral sense of self often motivates behavior.
Therefore, to reveal potential ingroup licensing effects, it is likely critical to examine ingroups
that are socially meaningful, and perhaps even morally laden.
The three existing studies on vicarious licensing all examined different potential ingroups
for licensing effects. Kouchaki (2011) studied ingroup licensing with somewhat-meaningful
ingroups (i.e., other students at the participant’s university). Banas and colleagues (2016) used
the more socially-relevant ingroups of nationality and gender identity. Lastly, Meijers et al.
(2019) had participants reflect on their best friend or partners, which primed participants with a
particularly close, yet not necessarily socially-relevant, ingroup. Given the sparse literature on
ingroup licensing, many potential ingroups remain unexamined.
The present study uses political identity because political affiliation is a central and
morally-laden dimension of social identity (Turner-Zwinkels, van Zomeren, & Postmes, 2016).
Other research demonstrates that political party affiliation leads to a strong sense of ingroup
identity (Balliet, Tybur, Wu, Antonellis, & Van Lange, 2018). In addition, Moral Foundations
Theory shows that moral judgements vary widely across the political spectrum (Graham, Haidt,
& Nosek, 2009). These findings suggest that people’s political identities are connected to their
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general social identities and moral concerns. Because political identities are both socially
relevant and highly moralized, ingroup licensing effects are likely to occur. As such, political
ingroups offer a compelling way to study ingroup moral licensing.
Comparing licensing and consistency
It would appear that moral licensing research directly contradicts the multitude of articles
on consistency. On the one hand, research on consistency reveals that people behave consistently
with their moral identity. Yet on the other hand, moral licensing research demonstrates that
people engage in a moral balancing act, which is a clear form of inconsistency. Although these
two bodies of research appear to be at odds, very few studies to date have attempted to directly
compare the two phenomena. Research by Conway and Peetz (2012) found that recalling recent
moral acts leads to moral licensing, whereas recalling more distant moral behavior leads to
consistency. Another similar study found that focusing on consequences leads to moral licensing,
whereas focusing on rules leads to moral consistency (Cornelissen, Bashshur, Rode, & Le
Menestrel, 2013). Two studies by Joosten, Van Dijke, Van Hiel, and De Cremer (2014) posit that
people morally license in social situations as a form of reputation management, and behave
consistently with prior moral deeds as a way to build and maintain a positive moral reputation.
Although these three articles begin to provide possible explanations and moderators for moral
licensing and consistency, many other moderators remain largely unexplored.
Although few studies have investigated variables to moderate consistency versus
licensing, some research suggests that identification with the target moral behavior might predict
consistency and licensing effects. For example, when told to imagine making environmentallyconscious purchases, participants with strong proenvironmental identities demonstrate
consistency effects, whereas participants with weaker proenvironmental identities exhibit moral
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licensing (Meijers, 2014). Similarly, other studies have demonstrated that low-identifiers exhibit
licensing behavior, whereas high-identifying participants exhibit consistency effects (e.g., Clot,
Grolleau, & Ibanez, 2014). The third study in Effron and colleagues’ (2009) article on racial
moral licensing found that after endorsing Obama, white participants with high levels of racial
prejudice felt increased comfort allocating funds to other white people, whereas participants with
low levels of racial prejudice allocated more funds to black people. These studies suggest that the
more someone identifies with the behavior in question (i.e., sees it as more integral or important
to their moral identity), the more likely they are to behave consistently with their prior behavior,
as opposed to exhibiting licensing effects. Although these findings point to identification as a
potential moderator of consistency and licensing effects, no other research to date has examined
identification specifically with non-prejudiced racial attitudes, in the context of political
ingroups, or as a predictor of both self and ingroup licensing effects.
The present research
Previous research has demonstrated licensing effects within different domains and tasks,
and with both actual and hypothetical behavior, but very little research examines vicarious
licensing effects. The question remains as to whether vicarious licensing extends to political
ingroup identity. Studies 1, 2, and 3 will address this ‘political ingroup licensing hypothesis’,
which argues that priming participants with a sense of their party’s morality will lead to political
ingroup licensing effects. Studies 1 and 3 test the ‘political identification hypothesis’, which
states that the strength of participants' political identification will moderate the relationship
between credentials and licensing, such that participants with stronger political identities will
demonstrate greater moral licensing effects.
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The present research also attempts to reconcile opposing consistency and licensing
findings. Very little research directly addresses whether certain variables help predict when
people opt for patterns of moral licensing as opposed to consistency. Thus, study 3 investigates
the conditions under which people morally license their behavior by using ingroup members'
good behavior as opposed to behaving consistently with their own prior moral behavior. Study 3
tests the ‘behavior identification hypothesis’, which holds that the strength of participants’
affiliation with the licensing domain will determine whether they demonstrate licensing or
consistency effects. We anticipate that participants with stronger moral identities will be more
likely to behave consistently with past moral behavior, whereas participants with weaker moral
identities will be more likely to exhibit moral licensing.
Study 1
Study 1 tests whether there is evidence for the ‘political ingroup licensing hypothesis’. This
study elicits moral credentials through fictional news stories of a political ingroup member’s
morality, and examines moral licensing effects through a charitable donation task.
Method
Participants. Participants (N=605) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Only participants who self-identified as Democrats or Republicans were allowed to participate.
After filtering out participants who did not pass the attention checks, 590 responses remained for
analysis. Of these participants, 382 were Democrats and 209 were Republicans. Our sample
included 323 men and 267 women. In addition, 421 participants were white, 91 were black or
African American, 54 were Asian, 2 were Hispanic or Latinx, and 22 were multiracial.
Participants ranged in age from 20 to 78 (M=38, SD=10.94). For their participation in the study,
participants were compensated $.45, plus an additional $.25 if they decided to keep the bonus.
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Design. Study 1 used an experimental design. The predictor variables were measured
level of political in-group affiliation and licensing condition. This study had two credentials
conditions (i.e., political positive and apolitical positive) and two control conditions (i.e.,
apolitical control and neutral control). The outcome variable was the degree of moral licensing.
Moral licensing was measured through the choice to keep or donate an additional $0.25.
Measures
Political group membership and identification. Strength of political identification was
assessed with the Political Group Identification Measure (Greenaway, Haslam, Cruwys,
Branscombe, Ysseldyk & Heldreth, 2015). The scale contained two items consisting of
statements regarding political affiliation and political identity. Before completing the scale,
participants first indicated their political group membership by responding to the question “Do
you identify as a Republican or Democrat?” Responses were scored (1=Republican;
2=Democrat; and 3=neither). Participants who did not identify with either political group were
sent to the end of the survey and were not compensated.
Depending on their stated political group, participants were presented answer-specific
Political Group Identification Measure scales that assessed their level of identification with their
party. Political group identification was measured using two items: “I identify with
Democrats/Republicans,” and “Being a Democrat/Republican is an important part of how I see
myself” (Greenaway et al., 2015). Participants rated their agreement using a seven-point Likert
scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). Greenaway et al. (2015) demonstrated that
the measure had strong reliability (r=.74, p<.001).
Demographic information. At the end of the survey before reading the debriefing form,
participants were asked of their age, gender identity, and racial identity. For gender identity and
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racial identity, participants were able to select as many answers as they wanted. The four options
for gender identity were “Male,” “Female,” “Nonbinary,” and “I identify as another gender
(please describe).” The last option allowed a text entry for participants to fill in their gender
identity. The options for racial identity were “White,” “Black or African American,” “American
Indian or Alaskan Native,” “Asian,” “Hispanic/Latinx,” “Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander,”
“Not listed (please describe),” or “Prefer not to say.” The penultimate option allowed a text entry
for participants to enter their racial identity. Participants were asked to type in their age.
Procedure
As part of an online survey created through www.qualtrics.com (Qualtrics, LLC, Utah,
USA), participants were asked to answer questions regarding politics and morality. The survey
was anonymous, which participants accessed from a specific link on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
The survey began by ensuring participants of anonymity, and participants were not asked any
personal questions other than age, gender, and race so that they felt comfortable answering
honestly. Participants were told that the study is interested in decisions and political preferences.
Conditions were randomized between participants, but measures were always presented in the
same order.
After giving consent, participants were asked whether they identify as a Democrat,
Republican, or neither. Participants who did not identify with either party did not complete the
remainder of the questionnaire. Based on indicated political group membership, participants
completed the two-item political group identification measure.
Next, participants were presented with a credentialing prime. Priming vignettes can be
found in Appendix A. In the political positive condition, participants read positive party-specific
articles on moralized topics important to Democrats and Republicans respectively. Democratic
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participants viewed a fictional article about a Democratic congressmen passing a progressive bill
(i.e., pro-climate legislation). Likewise, Republican participants read a fictional news story about
a Republican congressmen passing conservative-backed legislation (i.e., strengthening
immigration laws). In the apolitical positive condition, Democratic and Republican participants
read about a congressman from their indicated party doing a positive apolitical action (i.e.,
helping a person change a flat tire). In the apolitical control condition, participants read about a
congressman from the participant’s party doing an apolitical action (i.e.., attended the opening
night of a restaurant). In the neutral control condition, participants read about a congressman of
an unstated political party doing an apolticial action (i.e.., attended the opening night of a
restaurant). In all conditions, participants were asked to rate the morality of the politician, as
well as the morality of his actions, on 7-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly
agree).
After reading a fake news article, participants completed the licensing measure, which
was a charitable donation task based on Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin’s (2009) measure of moral
licensing. For this task, an instructions screen informed participants that in an effort to “give
back,” the lab conducting the study usually asks participants if they would like to make a small
donation of $0.25 to a charity of their choice. They were asked to select either “yes” or “no” to
donating the additional quarter. Participants were informed that in addition to donating their
quarter, two entries would be selected at random and their donations would be multiplied by
100x so that those participants’ total donations would equal $25 each. We chose to multiply two
random entries by 100x to ensure that participants felt as if their contribution had the potential to
make a substantial difference. They were also informed that if they selected “no” and their entry
was picked, the lab would not select another participant, but would instead donate $0 on their
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behalf. If participants chose to donate, they were given the opportunity to select a charity of their
choice from a list of options. This opportunity to donate measured licensing in that choosing to
keep, rather than donate, the extra $.25 can be interpreted as a form of licensing.
After participants completed the donation task, they answered demographic questions
regarding their age, race, and gender. Lastly, participants were thanked and brought to a
debriefing page with information regarding the true nature of the experiment and the various
experimental conditions, along with researchers’ emails to contact with any follow up questions
or concerns.
Results
We ran a linear regression model examining morality ratings as a function of condition
(credentials vs. control) and political party affiliation, and tested their interaction. There was a
significant difference in morality ratings by credentials condition, such that participants in the
two credentials conditions viewed the senator as more moral than participants in the control
conditions, t(586)=4.744, p<.001.Thus, the manipulation for the two experimental conditions
successfully increased participants’ perceptions of the senator’s morality. There was no overall
difference in morality ratings among Democrats and Republicans, t=1.552, p>.10. However,
there was a significant condition by political party interaction, such that credentialed democrats
reported higher ratings of the senator’s morality than credentialed republicans, t(586)=3.941,
p<.001. As a result, we can conclude that the manipulation provided greater credentials to
democrats than republicans, t(586)=3.941, p<.001.
Having confirmed that participants saw the actions in the credentials conditions as more
moral than those in the control conditions, we next examined whether this in turn led to greater
licensing. To assess this question, we examined the proportion of participants who chose to
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donate in each condition. Mean proportions of participants who chose to donate did not differ
between the apolitical control condition (M=.27, SD=.445) and the neutral control condition
(M=.27, SD=.415), t(296)=1.0016, p=.32. Thus, responses from participants in the two control
conditions were combined for additional analyses.
Next, we ran two linear regression models comparing each of the credentialing conditions
to the combined control conditions. Counter to our predicted pattern of results, participants were
not any more likely to donate in the control conditions (M=.24, SD=.431) as compared to the
apolitical positive condition (M=.31, SD=.463), t(442)=.1175, p=.12, or as compared to the
political positive condition (M=.23, SD=0.420), t(442)=.2317, p=.82. Figure 1 depicts the
percentages of participants who chose to keep the additional quarter, collapsed across the 2
control conditions and the 2 credentials conditions.
After comparing mean donations by condition, we tested the two potential moderators:
strength of political identity and political affiliation (i.e., Republican or Democrat). First, we ran
a regression predicting licensing by condition and political affiliation, and tested the interaction
between the two variables. The overall model did predict licensing significantly, F(3,586)=2.136,
p >.05, multiple R2=.01.The regression predicting licensing by condition and political affiliation
did not find a main effect of condition on licensing, t(586)=.49, p=.62, or a main effect of
political identification on licensing, t(586)=1.36, p=.17. Furthermore, the effect of condition on
licensing did not differ depending on political party affiliation, t(586)=.577, p=.56.
Lastly, we ran a regression predicting licensing by condition and strength of participants'
political identification, and tested the interaction between the two variables. Before running the
regression we standardized the strength of political identification measure. We did not find a
main effect of credentials condition on licensing, t(586)=.13, p=.90, or a main effect of
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standardized strength of political affiliation on licensing, t(586)=.69, p=.49. The effect of
condition on licensing did not differ as a result of the strength of participants’ political
identification, t(586)=.61, p=.54.
Discussion
Inconsistent with previous research, study 1 failed to obtain evidence for ingroup
licensing effects. Although participants in the two credentials conditions viewed the senator as
more moral than participants in the two control conditions, there was no difference in mean
proportions of participants who chose to donate in the credentialing conditions compared to the
control conditions. We also did not find evidence that either political party or strength of political
identification moderated these results.
Study 2
Given that study 1 failed to find the predicted licensing effects, study 2 used a different
manipulation of credentials. For the ingroup credentialing condition, we modified the ingroup
news articles to more broadly discuss the morality of the political party as a whole, rather than
the morality of a specific senator. Likewise, the ingroup control discusses the entire party rather
than a certain politician. We made this change because we anticipated that broadening the focus
of the prime would give participants greater moral credentials due to an increased sense of
ingroup identity.
In addition to a modified ingroup credentialing vignette, study 2 also included self
credentialing conditions. By including these conditions, we can directly replicate the
methodology from previous self licensing research, and test whether we can find evidence for
these frequently demonstrated licensing effects. We used Monin and Miller’s (2001) widely cited
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hiring task, in which participants are led to select a highly-qualified Black applicant for a job
instead of less-qualified white applicants, and thus earn moral credentials.
Lastly, in study 2 we changed the measure of moral licensing to Monin and Miller’s
(2001) racist police force hiring task. We changed the measure as an attempt to eliminate the
ceiling effects seen in study 1. In addition, by including both Monin and Miller’s (2001)
credentialing manipulation and licensing measure, we will be able to interpret our pattern of
results by comparing them to the original findings on moral licensing.
Method
Participants. Participants (N=568) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Only participants who self-identified as Democrats or Republicans were allowed to participate.
After filtering out participants who did not pass the attention checks, 490 responses remained for
analysis. Of these participants, 302 were Democrats and 188 were Republicans. Participants
included 269 men and 221 women. In addition, 380 participants were white, 55 were black or
African American, 3 were American Indian or Alaska Native, 29 were Asian, 6 were Hispanic or
Latinx, and 17 were multiracial. Participants ranged in age from 19 to 82 (M=37, SD=11.78). For
their participation in the study, participants were compensated $.45.
Design. Study 2 implements a 2 (credentials: credentialing vs. control) x 2 (target:
ingroup vs. self) between-groups design. Thus, the four possible conditions were as follows:
ingroup credentialing, ingroup control, self credentialing, and self control. The predictor
variables were credentials condition and target. Study 2 also measured participants’ level of
political in-group affiliation. Credentials condition had two levels: credentialing and control.
Target also had two levels: participants were either credentialed through political ingroup
members’ actions (“ingroup”) or through their own actions (“self”). The outcome variable was
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the degree of moral licensing. Moral licensing was measured through participants’ indication that
a job is better suited for a White applicant than a Black applicant. Saying the job is not wellsuited for a Black applicant was interpreted as evidence of moral licensing.
Measures
Political group membership and identification. As in study 1, strength of political
identification was assessed with the Political Group Identification Measure (Greenaway et al.,
2015).
Demographic information. At the end of the survey before reading the debriefing form,
participants were asked of their age, gender identity, and racial identity. For gender identity and
racial identity, participants were able to select as many answers as they wanted. The four options
for gender identity were “Male,” “Female,” “Nonbinary,” and “I identify as another gender
(please describe).” The last option allowed a text entry for participants to fill in their gender
identity. The options for racial identity were “White,” “Black or African American,” “American
Indian or Alaskan Native,” “Asian,” “Hispanic/Latinx,” “Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander,”
“Not listed (please describe),” or “Prefer not to say.” The penultimate option allowed a text entry
for participants to enter their racial identity. Participants were asked to type in their age.
Procedure
As part of an online survey created through www.qualtrics.com (Qualtrics, LLC, Utah,
USA), participants were asked to answer questions regarding politics and morality. The survey
was anonymous, which participants accessed from a specific link on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
The survey began by ensuring participants of anonymity, and participants were not asked any
personal questions other than age, gender, and race so that they felt comfortable answering
honestly. Participants were told that the study is interested in decisions and political preferences.
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Conditions were randomized between participants, but measures were always presented in the
same order.
After giving consent, participants were asked whether they identify as a Democrat,
Republican, or neither. Participants who did not identify with either party did not complete the
remainder of the questionnaire. Based on indicated political group membership, participants
completed the two-item political group identification measure.
Next, participants were assigned to one of four possible credentialing primes: ingroup
credentialing, ingroup control, self credentialing, or self control. In the two self conditions,
credentialing occurred through an appeal to participants' own moral behavior, rather than through
political ingroup members’ moral behavior. Because self licensing has been reliably
demonstrated by many studies, the two self credentialing conditions were included to ensure that
the measure of moral licensing (i.e., the police force hiring task) indeed works. These conditions
illuminated how any observed ingroup-based licensing effect compares to the self-licensing
effect.
In the two self conditions, participants viewed the faces and qualifications of 5 applicants
for a consulting job and they have to indicate which applicant should be hired. In the self
credentialing condition, the most qualified candidate is the sole Black applicant. The expectation
is that participants will select the Black candidate, and thus establish their non-prejudiced moral
credentials. By making this moral choice, participants should feel credentialed, therefore
becoming more likely to exhibit moral licensing in the subsequent licensing task. In the control
condition, all five applicants are White and thus participants do not get the opportunity to
establish their lack of bias. As a result, participants will not earn moral credentials through the
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credentialing task, and therefore will be less likely to exhibit moral licensing in the licensing
measure. For the full measure, including the text and images, see Appendix B.
In the two ingroup conditions, participants read fictional news stories about their political
party. The text for these two conditions can be found in Appendix C. In the ingroup credentialing
condition, credentials were established by presenting participants with a fictional news article
lauding Republicans'/Democrats' general success in advancing their party's agenda in recent
years. In the ingroup control condition, the news article described the party's success at
expanding voter outreach. As a manipulation check for the ingroup credentialing conditions,
participants were asked how moral the Republican/Democratic party is, and how well the party
fights for its core values. Higher scores on these two questions for participants in the credentials
conditions as compared to the control condition would indicate that the credentialing
manipulation was effective in eliciting moral credentialing effects.
After completing a quick attention check, participants responded to the licensing
measure. In this measure, participants are told about a job opening in a rural police force, and are
asked to indicate whether the job is better suited for a White or a Black applicant (1 = yes, much
better for a Black person to 7 = yes, much better for a White person). Higher scores indicate
greater moral licensing effects. The text of this measure can be found in Appendix D. Previous
studies have shown that saying the job is not well suited for a Black applicant can be interpreted
as a moral licensing effect (e.g., Bradley-Geist et al., 2010; Effron et al., 2009; Cascio & Plant,
2015).
Upon completion of the licensing measure, participants answered demographic questions
regarding their age, race, and gender. Lastly, they were thanked and brought to a debriefing page
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with information regarding the true nature of the experiment and the various experimental
conditions, along with researchers’ emails to contact with any follow up questions or concerns.
Results
We first examined morality ratings in the two ingroup conditions to ensure that the
credentialing manipulation led participants to perceive their party as more moral. Indeed, an
ANOVA revealed that the manipulation successfully led participants in the ingroup licensing
condition to view their party as more moral (M=6.95, SD=1.20) than participants in the control
condition (M=6.48, SD=1.46), F(1,289)=9.37, p=.002.
According to the ingroup licensing prediction, participants in the political condition
should be more likely to recommend a White applicant for a job than participants in the control
condition. However, there was no effect of condition on licensing in either the ingroup or the self
licensing conditions. For participants in the ingroup licensing conditions, responses to the hiring
question did not differ between the control condition (M=4.40, SD=1.30) and the political
condition (M=4.41, SD=1.11), t(327)=.115, p=.91. Likewise, in the self licensing conditions,
there were no statistically significant differences between the control condition (M=4.49,
SD=1.01) the self credentials condition (M=4.19, SD=1.20), t(161)=1.76, p=.08. See figure 2 for
a graph of marginal means in the 4 conditions.
We then ran a 2x2 ANOVA examining condition by political party. Although there were
no main effects of condition on licensing, we found a significant interaction between self
credential condition and political party affiliation (Figure 3), such that among Republicans
credentials led to stronger licensing, whereas among Democrats credentials led to decreased
licensing, F(1,133)=4.28, p=.041. Within this significant interaction, a pairwise comparison
revealed that the effect of condition on licensing among Democrats was significant, F(1,
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93)=4.70, p=.033, whereas the effect of condition on licensing among Republicans did not reach
significance, F(1,44)=1.05, p=.311.
Discussion
Although the manipulation successfully led participants in the ingroup licensing
condition to view their party as more moral, study 2 failed to find evidence of ingroup licensing
effects. Surprisingly, we also failed to replicate frequently-demonstrated self licensing effects.
However, we found a significant interaction in the self credentials condition that revealed that
after reading about their party’s morality, Republicans were more likely to say a job is better
suited for a White applicant, whereas Democrats were less likely to indicate this racial hiring
preference.
We did not anticipate this crossover interaction; however, upon further consideration this
pattern of results fits with existing research on the values of Democrats and Republicans.
Research has demonstrated that Democrats tend to favor racial equality (Jacobsmeier, 2015).
Furthermore, highly dominant and authoritarian white students endorse color-blind racial
attitudes, which in turn predicts modern racism attitudes (Poteat & Spanierman, 2012). The
qualities of dominance and authoritarianism are far more common among Republicans than
Democrats (Womick, Rothmund, Azevedo, King, & Jost, 2019). This research suggests that
when primed with their political affiliation, and thus their political party’s values of antiprejudice, Democrats may be less likely to demonstrate moral licensing because they highly
value behaving in non-prejudiced ways.
Study 3
Given that people have many malleable facets to their identity that can vary in salience in
different contexts, certain moral identities should strongly influence prosocial behavior when that
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particular identity has been primed (Markus & Kunda, 1986). More specifically, when primed
with egalitarianism, participants who value non-prejudiced behavior should behave more
prosocially. The racial credentials manipulation in the previous studies likely primed participants
with strong egalitarian identities to reflect on their non-prejudiced values. As a result, these antiracist participants may have felt compelled to answer in particularly unbiased ways rather than
display the predicted moral licensing pattern. Their salient prior egalitarian behavior may have
led them to display additional unbiased attitudes later in the study. These participants could be
thought of as exhibiting moral consistency effects.
Thus, study 3 attempts to examine the impact of moral identity by examining
identification with anti-prejudiced behavior as a potential moderator between moral licensing
and consistency effects. This moderator measures variability in people’s values regarding
explicit racism. Our third study is akin to Effron and colleagues’ (2009) third study, in which the
researchers found that white participants with high levels of racial prejudice displayed moral
licensing effects, whereas participants with low levels of racial prejudice evidenced behavioral
consistency. Similarly, we hypothesized that the strength of participants’ affiliation with the
licensing domain (i.e., anti-racism) determines whether they demonstrate licensing or
consistency effects. We anticipated that participants with stronger anti-racist identities would be
more likely to behave consistently with past moral behavior, whereas participants with weaker
anti-racist identities would be more likely to exhibit moral licensing.
Finally, in study 3 we changed the licensing task from measuring participants’ attitudes
toward explicitly racist actions to ambiguously racist actions. Study 3 measured licensing by
using Crosby and Monin’s (2013) licensing measure, in which participants evaluate ambiguously
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prejudiced behaviors. We anticipated that participants would be more likely to display licensing
effects if the licensing task did not involve explicit racism.
Method
Participants. Participants (N=528) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Only participants who self-identified as Democrats or Republicans were allowed to participate.
After filtering out participants who did not pass the attention checks, 458 responses remained for
analysis. Of these participants, 158 were Republicans and 300 were Democrats. Participants
included 243 men, 213 women, and 2 participants who did not identify as either male or female.
In addition, 365 participants were white, 26 were black or African American, 1 was American
Indian or Alaska Native, 42 were Asian, 1 was Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, 1 was
Hispanic or Latinx, and 14 were multiracial. Participants ranged in age from 20 to 75 (M=41,
SD=12.25). For their participation in the study, participants were compensated $.45.
Design. Study 3 used an experimental design. The outcome variable for all conditions
was degree of moral licensing. Moral licensing was measured through a rating task of
ambiguously racist behavior (Crosby & Monin, 2013). A lower average score indicated a greater
degree of moral licensing. The independent variables were target and credentials. This study also
measured participants’ level of political ingroup affiliation and their identification with licensing
domain (i.e., anti-discrimination) as potential predictor variables.
Participants were assigned to one of three conditions: self-credentialing, ingroupcredentialing, or non-credentialing control. The self-credentialing condition and the noncredentialing control used the same racial hiring task as study 2 (Monin & Miller, 2001). Unlike
in study 2, participants in the ingroup credentials condition were shown the Monin and Miller
(2001) racial hiring task, but instead of answering it they were simply told that members of their
political party overwhelmingly selected the Black applicant for the job. This statement served to

VICARIOUS MORAL LICENSING IN POLITICAL INGROUPS

30

establish their ingroup’s morality. As in study 2, participants in the non-credentialing control
condition were presented five While applicants, and thus were unable to establish their non-racist
moral credentials.
Measures
Political group membership and identification. As in the first two studies, study 3
assessed strength of political affiliation with the Political Group Identification Measure
(Greenaway et al., 2015).
Moral licensing. Study 3 measured licensing by using Crosby and Monin (2013)
licensing measure. Participants were asked to evaluate five ambiguously racist behaviors on a 9point Likert scale from “definitely NOT discrimination” to “definitely discrimination” with a
mid-point labeled “not sure” (e.g., “A woman is walking alone at night and sees a Black man
coming towards her. She crosses the street.”). The full measure can be found in the Appendix E.
Participants with lower average scores were considered to exhibit higher levels of moral
licensing.
Target behavior identification. Identification with the target behavior (i.e., anti-racism)
was measured using the five item Internal Motivation to Respond without Prejudice Scale (IMS)
(Plant & Devine, 1998). All five questions pertained to valuing non-prejudiced behavior toward
Black people (e.g., “I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways toward Black people because it is
personally important to me”). See Appendix F for the full measure. Participants rated their
agreement on a 9-point Likert scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”
Higher scores indicate greater identification with the target behavior. The IMS had reasonably
strong reliability (alphas ranging from .76 to .85) and test-retest reliability (r=.77). In addition,
IMS scores correlated with traditional measures of prejudice, including the Attitude Towards
Blacks scale (Brigham, 1993) and the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986).
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Procedure
As part of an online survey created through www.qualtrics.com (Qualtrics, LLC, Utah,
USA) and run through Mechanical Turk, participants were asked to answer questions regarding
politics and morality. The survey was anonymous, which participants accessed from a specific
link on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The survey began by ensuring participants of anonymity, and
participants were not asked any personal questions other than age, gender, race, and political
affiliation so that they felt comfortable answering honestly. Participants were told that the study
is interested in decisions and political preferences. Conditions were randomized between
participants, but measures were always presented in the same order.
Participants were asked whether they identify as a Democrat, Republican, or neither.
Participants who did not identify with either party did not complete the remainder of the
questionnaire. Based on indicated political group membership, participants completed the twoitem political group identification measure.
Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (i.e., selfcredentialing, ingroup-credentialing, or a non-credentialing control) and completed the
credentialing hiring task. Participants in the ingroup credentialing condition also completed a
manipulation check asking whether they believed their ingroup members’ actions were moral.
Next, all participants completed the ambiguous racism licensing measure. After the licensing
measure, participants completed the IMS to assess the extent to which being anti-racist is
important to their identity. Next, all participants were sent to the demographics questionnaire.
Participants were asked their age, gender identity, and racial identity. Lastly, participants were
thanked and brought to a debriefing page with information regarding the true nature of the
experiment and the various experimental conditions, along with researchers’ emails to contact
with any follow up questions or concerns.
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Results
The manipulation of ingroup morality appeared effective: ratings of party morality were
high for the ingroup credentialing condition for both Republicans (M=6.66, SD=1.65) and
Democrats (M=6.69, SD=1.46). This result suggests that the manipulation successfully led both
Republicans and Democrats to view their party’s morality favorably after learning of their fellow
party members’ non-prejudiced choices.
Next, we tested whether condition was a predictor of licensing. We found that there were
no statistically significant differences between the non-credentialing control condition mean
(M=4.55, SD=1.71), the ingroup-credentialing conditions (M=4.58, SD=1.78), and the selfcredentialing condition (M=4.39, SD=1.70) as determined by a one-way ANOVA,
F(2,454)=.614, p=.541. See figure 4 for a graph of the marginal means.
Furthermore, neither moderator predicted licensing behavior. We ran a regression
examining the relationship between condition and licensing with standardized strength of
political identification as a moderator. Differences in political strength did not moderate
licensing behavior, t(274)=.672, p=.50. There was also no interaction between condition and
strength of political affiliation, t(274)=.467, p=.64.
We ran two linear regression models that separately compare the control condition to
each of the credentials conditions. We found that although identification with the target behavior
was a significant predictor of licensing, t(254)=4.48, p<.001, this effect was not moderated by
condition when comparing the non-credentialing control condition to either the ingroupcredentials participants t(279)=1.12, p=.27, or the self-credentials participants t(254)=.70, p=.48.
Discussion
We hypothesized that the strength of participants’ affiliation with the licensing domain
would determine whether they demonstrate licensing or consistency effects. Study 3 failed to
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find evidence for this prediction. Responses to the ambiguous racism licensing measure did not
differ by condition. In addition, neither moderator predicted licensing behavior.
General discussion
The present research examined ingroup licensing effects specifically as they relate to
political ingroup identity, and investigated the conditions under which people license their
immoral actions as opposed to behaving consistently with their prior moral behavior. We tested
the ‘political ingroup licensing hypothesis’, which predicted that priming participants with a
sense of their party’s morality would lead to moral credentials and thus political ingroup
licensing effects. Credentialed participants were expected to demonstrate licensing by choosing
to keep money rather than donate it (study 1), recommending a White applicant for a job (study
2), and indicating that fewer ambiguous behaviors were racist (study 3).
We also tested the ‘political identification hypothesis’, which posited that strength of
political affiliation would moderate the relationship between credentials and licensing, such that
participants with stronger political identities would demonstrate greater moral licensing. Finally,
we also tested the ‘behavior identification hypothesis’, which predicted that the strength of
participants’ affiliation with the licensing domain would determine whether they demonstrate
licensing or consistency effects, such that participants with stronger moral identities would be
more likely to behave consistently with past moral behavior, whereas participants with weaker
moral identities would be more likely to exhibit moral licensing. Altogether, the three studies in
this project did not find strong support for any of these hypotheses. We failed to find evidence of
political ingroup moral licensing. Likewise, political party, strength of political affiliation, and
identification with the target behavior all failed to moderate the relationship between condition
and licensing.
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Overall, although the present research failed to find evidence for the main hypotheses,
certain patterns emerge from the data that suggest evidence of consistency effects. In study 1, the
direction of relationship between the credentials conditions and the control conditions was the
opposite of what a licensing hypothesis would predict. That is to say, people in the credentials
conditions chose to donate money more often than participants in the control condition. Although
these results did not reach statistical significance, the pattern suggests that after being primed
with their party’s morality, participants in the credentials conditions behaved consistently with
their ingroup members' good deeds.
Similarly, in study 2 there was a significant interaction in the self credentials condition
that revealed that after earning moral credentials, Republicans were more likely to say a job is
better suited for a White applicant, whereas Democrats were less likely to indicate this racial
hiring preference. It is important to note that within this significant interaction, the effect of
condition on licensing among Democrats, but not Republicans, was significant. This pattern of
results reveals consistency effects among Democrats, but does not provide evidence of moral
licensing among Republicans.
Lastly, study 3 established that identification with a target behavior significantly predicts
licensing effects. More specifically, participants who strongly identified as having nonprejudiced attitudes were more likely to report that ambiguous behaviors were racist. These antiracist participants behaved more consistently with their prior moral behavior than participants for
whom non-prejudiced attitudes are less central to their identities. This result might suggest that
reinforcing values makes people more likely to behave consistently with their prior moral
actions. When taken together, these three patterns taken from each of the studies in this article
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lend support for a consistency-based explanation of moral behavior when considering political
ingroups.
Integrating current findings with prior research
As previously discussed, prior licensing research has established moral licensing effects
in many domains, and with both real and hypothetical actions, and with the credentialing agent
as the self or an ingroup member. Considering this vast body of research, why did the three
present studies fail to find evidence of moral licensing?
There are multiple plausible explanations for why we failed to find evidence of moral
licensing. First, due to the anonymous nature of the Mechanical Turk platform, participants may
have felt less social pressure to behave morally. Indeed, a study of the impact of anonymity on
social desirability in online questionnaires revealed that people feel disinhibited online and thus
do not behave as prosocially as they would in real-life settings (Joinson, 1999). This finding
might suggest that our licensing measure results may have inaccurately skewed toward immoral
behavior regardless of condition because neither set of participants likely felt strong social
pressure to respond prosocially. That is to say, perhaps our results are not due to a failure to
increase immoral behavior in the credentialing task, but rather that immoral behavior was higher
in all conditions as a result of anonymity. Thus, the pattern of results may stem from a failure of
the control condition rather than the credentials condition. In sum, perhaps the present null
licensing effects can be attributed to the anonymity of the online survey format leading
participants to not feel the necessary social pressure to establish their morality.
Another explanation for our null licensing results is that in the present day, many people
may be unwilling to credential or license either ambiguous or unambiguous racist behavior.
Research suggests that racism -- both explicit and implicit -- has declined steadily in recent years
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(Charlesworth & Banaji, 2019). Other research argues that by some measures, racial prejudice
may have decreased in white Americans since the election of Trump (Hopkins & Washington,
2019). These findings suggest two related possibilities. First, based on the apparent decrease in
racism over time, one might speculate that many people would not receive strong moral
credentials from acting non-prejudiced because people may not view egalitarian behavior as
particularly moral or praise-worthy in the present day. It is plausible that being anti-racist is more
of a given in 2020 than back in the early 2000s when many of the cited racial hiring task studies
were conducted. Second, these findings might suggest that people are unwilling to license
prejudiced behavior. That is to say, even if people are able to gain moral credentials by
displaying unbiased racial attitudes, perhaps they are unwilling to express explicit racism in the
racial licensing measures (i.e., Monin and Miller’s (2001) police hiring task, and Crosby and
Monin’s (2013) ambiguous racism measure). Either of these possibilities could begin to explain
why moral licensing patterns did not emerge in these three studies. Our third study supports this
explanation by demonstrating that participants did not receive moral credentials from selecting
the highly-qualified black applicant. Additionally, the trend from the second study also fits this
rationale because overall these participants did not receive moral credentials from selecting the
black applicant.
To test whether changing racial attitudes might impact the explanatory power of these
manipulations, future research should examine credentialing manipulations and licensing
measures in domains other than race. Domains such as cheating (e.g., Jordan et al., 2011),
willingness to volunteer (e.g., Conway & Peetz, 2012), charitable donations (e.g., Clot, Grolleau,
& Ibanez, 2014), offering corrupt versus honest advice (e.g., Cain, Loewenstein, & Moore,
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2010), and stealing money (e.g., Mazar & Zhong, 2010) would eliminate the risk of interference
from changing social norms, because these domains are less likely to change over time.
Finally, the present research may not have found evidence of moral licensing because the
effect in the literature is perhaps not as strong as researchers previously assumed. Blanken and
colleagues (2015) argue that there is evidence of publication bias within the moral licensing
literature. A regression test of the symmetry of their funnel plot revealed strong evidence for the
presence of publication bias, t(55) = 5.72, p < .001. In addition, Blanken et al. (2015) tested
study publication status (i.e., published or unpublished) as a moderator, and found that
publication status significantly influenced licensing effect sizes such that published studies had
larger effect sizes (d = 0.43, SE = 0.04) than unpublished studies (d = 0.11, SE = 0.06), QM(1) =
20.66, p < .001. These two findings suggest that smaller studies that failed to find significant
evidence for moral licensing may have gone unpublished, and as a result overall moral licensing
evidence may have a smaller effect size than previously cited. The current three studies had
strong statistical power as a result of large sample sizes, so our null findings are particularly
noteworthy. Thus, the present research calls into question the strength of moral licensing effects.
The current research not only failed to find evidence of moral self licensing, but also did
not find results supporting the ‘political ingroup licensing hypothesis’. So far no direct evidence
exists to support the idea that political ingroups can elicit vicarious licensing effects. Although
prior research shows that political ingroups are socially relevant and highly moralized, there is a
chance that these qualities do not in fact impact ingroup licensing. Most previous research has
only investigated ingroup licensing effects in the context of a close other. Of the three studies on
ingroup licensing, two examined ingroup licensing effects in the context of people the participant
already knew (i.e., other students at the participant’s university (Kouchaki, 2011), or the
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participant’s best friend or partner (Meijers et al., 2019). The third study referenced people of the
same nationality and gender identity (Banas et al., 2016), which may yield stronger ingroup
identification than political party affiliation. As such, the question remains as to whether only
close others and highly relevant social ingroups can provide the moral credentials necessary to
license one’s own behavior, or whether other relevant ingroups such as political identity can
elicit licensing as well. Future research should examine ingroup licensing effects with other
socially relevant ingroups. In addition, researchers may want to compare ingroup licensing
effects with close others and with unknown ingroup members, to test whether these effects differ
in strength.
The present three studies failed to find strong evidence for any of the three proposed
hypotheses. Studies 1, 2, and 3 did not support the ‘political ingroup licensing hypothesis’. In
addition, studies 1 and 3 failed to find evidence of the ‘political identification hypothesis’, and
study 3 did not support the ‘behavior identification hypothesis’. However, one might find these
null findings encouraging, because they suggest that people do not simply excuse their immoral
behavior based on their own previous actions, or based on their group membership. These results
could be read as evidence that participants still felt accountable for their behavior even after
learning of an ingroup member’s good deeds, or after demonstrating their own morality.
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Figures

Figure 1. Percentage of participants who chose to keep the money in the combined control
conditions and combined credentials conditions.
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Figure 2. Means of licensing in the 4 conditions, split by self licensing and ingroup licensing.
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Figure 3. Condition by political party interaction in the self credentials condition.
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Figure 4. Means of licensing in the 3 credentials conditions.
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Appendix A
Republican political positive:
Senator Anderson Votes in Favor of Immigration Crackdown
Republican senator Anderson voted in favor of a pioneering piece of legislation that will
decrease the number of immigrants allowed to enter the United States per year. The bill passed
by a small margin, and will take effect in 2020. After the vote, Anderson hailed the passage of
the bill, saying, “This is a pivotal step in ensuring our country’s continued success.” Border
security groups praise the bill as being one of the strongest crackdowns on immigration that the
US has seen in the past decade. In response to the recent vote… (Continued on page 4)

Democrat political positive:
Senator Anderson Votes in Favor of Pro-climate Legislation
Democratic senator Anderson voted in favor of a pioneering piece of legislation that will double
consumers’ use of renewable energy sources by 2030. The bill passed by a small margin, and
will take effect in 2020. After the vote, Anderson hailed the passage of the bill, saying, “This is a
pivotal step in ensuring our country’s continued success.” Environmentalist organizations praise
the bill as being one of the strongest pro-climate initiatives that the US has seen in the past
decade. In response to the recent vote… (Continued on page 4)

Republican/Democrat apolitical positive:
Senator Anderson Helps Local Man Change a Flat Tire
Yesterday evening, while coming home from work, Republican/Democratic senator Anderson
stopped during a snowstorm to help a local man change a flat tire. The man expressed his
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appreciation that Anderson helped him get home to his family in time for dinner, especially
given the inclement weather. Anderson was quoted, saying… (Continued on page 4)

Republican/Democrat apolitical control:
Senator Anderson Attends the Opening Night of The Corner Table
Yesterday evening, Republican/Democratic senator Anderson attended the opening night of new
restaurant The Corner Table. The Corner Table is a casual American restaurant, serving
mouthwatering comfort food made from local ingredients. Anderson ordered the signature dish,
and praised the establishment for its… (Continued on page 4)

Republican/Democrat neutral control:
Senator Anderson Attends the Opening Night of The Corner Table
Yesterday evening, senator Anderson attended the opening night of new restaurant The Corner
Table. The Corner Table is a casual American restaurant, serving mouthwatering American
comfort food made from local ingredients. Anderson ordered the signature dish, and praised the
establishment for its… (Continued on page 4)
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Appendix B
A large financial consulting firm is looking to hire an employee for a starting position. The
search committee has narrowed their selection down to these five applicants. Whom would you
recommend they hire?

Credentials:

Control:

VICARIOUS MORAL LICENSING IN POLITICAL INGROUPS

56

Appendix C
Experts Laud Republicans’ Success in Advancing Core Values
Political pundits agree that over the past 3 years Republicans have been remarkably successful in
advancing their party’s agenda. Republican politicians have fought tirelessly to reduce taxes and
to decrease government control over American citizens’ lives. The party has worked to preserve
traditional family values. Republicans have fought hard for free market capitalism. Furthermore,
the party has preserved Second Amendment gun rights for Americans. Most experts agree that,
in their efforts over the past few years, Republicans have been more productive and successful
than what even their most ardent supporters could have hoped for.

Experts Laud Democrats’ Success in Advancing Core Values
Political pundits agree that over the past 3 years Democrats have been remarkably successful in
advancing their party’s agenda. Democratic politicians have fought tirelessly to combat
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and sexual orientation. The party has worked to
expand access to health care. Democrats have fought hard to protect the rights of immigrants.
Furthermore, the party has prioritized environmental protection. Most experts agree that, in their
efforts over the past few years, Democrats have been more productive and successful than what
even their most ardent supporters could have hoped for.

Experts Laud Republicans’/Democrats’ Success in Voter Outreach
Political pundits agree that over the past 3 years Republicans/Democrats have been remarkably
successful in expanding their party’s base. The party has steadily increased their number of
donors, and has prioritized canvassing initiatives to directly communicate with voters.
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Republican/Democratic politicians have succeeded in communicating their ideas across media
platforms, and have sought out numerous speaking opportunities on TV shows.

How moral is the Republican/Democratic party?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Highly
immoral

9
Highly
moral

How well does the Republican/Democratic party fight for its core values?
1
Not well
at all

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Exceptionally
well
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Appendix D
Imagine that you are the police chief of a small town in a rural area of the United States.
Historically the population of the town has been exclusively White, and attitudes towards other
ethnicities tend to be unfavorable. As much as you regret it, you know this is especially the case
within your unit. You couldn't help overhearing racist jokes coming from people you otherwise
consider excellent officers. In fact a couple of years ago an African-American patrolman joined
your unit, and within a year he quit, complaining about hostile working conditions. You are
doing what you can to change attitudes, but your main objective is that the police force should do
its job, and so far it has been rather effective so you do not want to provoke any major unrest
within the ranks.
The time has come to recruit a new officer. As a general rule, officers need to be
responsible and trustworthy, show quick intelligence enabling them to make split-second
decisions in crisis situations. Recent scandals have also highlighted the need for a high level of
integrity, resistance to corruption, mild manners and a calm temper.
You have just received applications from the new graduates of the local Police Academy.
You wonder whether ethnicity should be a factor in your choice.

Do you feel that this specific position (described above) is better suited for any one ethnicity?
1
Yes, much
better for a
Black person

2

3

4
I do not
feel this
way at all

5

6

7
Yes, much
better for a
White person
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Appendix E
Instructions: For the situations described below, please tell us if, in your opinion, the behavior
constitutes discrimination.
1. A company conducts regular business on Martin Luther King Jr. Day.
2. A clothing chain with a “preppy” image employs significantly more White than Black
salespeople.
3. A police officer stops a Black male whose clothing and hair match the description of a
crime suspect.
4. A woman is walking alone at night and sees a Black man coming toward her. She crosses
the street.
5. A school discontinues its affirmative action policy, resulting in a decrease in minority
students.

1

2

Definitely
NOT
discrimination

3

4

5
Not sure

6

7

8

9
Definitely
discrimination
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Appendix F
Instructions: Please rate your agreement with the following statements on the scale provided.
1. I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally
important to me.
2. According to my personal values, using stereotypes about Black people is OK. (Reverse
coded)
3. I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward Black people.
4. Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about Black people is
wrong.
5. Being nonprejudiced toward Black people is important to my self-concept.

1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Strongly
agree

